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ABSTRACT
Aviation and cognitive science researchers have identified
situations in which the pilot’s expectations for the
behavior of the avionics are not matched by the actual
behavior of the avionics. Researchers have attributed
these “automation surprises” to the complexity of the
avionics mode logic, the absence of complete training,
limitations in cockpit displays, and ad-hoc conceptual
models of the avionics.
Complete canonical rule-based descriptions of the
behavior of the autopilot provide the basis for
understanding the perceived complexity of the autopilots,
the differences between the pilot’s and autopilot’s
conceptual models, and the limitations in training
materials and cockpit displays.
This paper compares the behavior of the autopilot Vertical
Speed/Flight Path Angle (VS-FPA) mode as described in
the Flight Crew Operators Manual (FCOM) and the actual
behavior of the VS-FPA mode defined in the autopilot
software. This example demonstrates the use of the
Operational Procedure Model (OPM) as a method for
using the requirements specification for the design of the
software logic as information requirements for training.
1. INTRODUCTION
The FAA report, Interfaces Between Flightcrews and
Modern Flightdeck Systems [4], identifies issues
associated with pilot’s management of automation (pages
33 to 41). The report catalogues gaps in pilot’s
understanding of the capabilities, the limitations, the
modes, and the operating principles and techniques of
modern cockpit automation. The report describes
“automation surprises” where the automation behaved in
ways the flight crew did not expect. As an example, the
report cites Wiener’s [12] studies where frequently asked
questions of the of the avionics behavior: “What is it
doing now?” “Why is it doing that?” and “What’s it
going to do next?” The report also describes differing
pilot decisions about the appropriate levels of automation
and the different assumptions made by manufacturers in
designing these systems.
These issues with the cooperation between pilots and
avionics are demonstrated by airline policies that prohibit
use of certain parts of the automation, and by pilots who
choose not to use parts of the automation [3], [6].
Researchers have cited the limits of human cognition,
operational complexity, ad-hoc conceptual models of the
avionics, and limitations in the content and form of
cockpit displays and training materials as factors
contributing to “automation surprise” events. Cockpit
displays and training material are the primary source of
the structure and content of the pilots’ mental model of
the operation of the avionics. The constructs, grammars,
and visual representation of this information are critical to
the formulation of accurate, rapid, complex, flexible, and
meaningful pilot mental models.
Content and Form of Training Material
Airframers and airline operators have traditionally avoided
the conceptual model issue by only providing training for
the basic operating techniques of the automation. Pilots
are given the knowledge to perform certain “critical” tasks
with the avionics and then required to develop their own
mental model through operational “line” flying and the
operator manuals provided by the manufacturer and/or
airline.
The official source of information on the operation of the
avionics is the Flight Crew Operators Manual (FCOM).
The FCOM is written and published by the airframe
manufacturer. Airlines typically republish adapted
versions of the airframers FCOM with additional airline
specific information, policies and procedures.
The FCOM is required to include a wide range of
information:
• description of the cockpit panels and displays
• procedures (normal operation) for each phase of flight
• procedures (abnormal and emergency operation) for
each phase of flight
• checklists
• description of the modes and the behavior of the
modes of the aircraft systems
• description of the architecture of the aircraft systems
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An FCOM is typically developed during flight-test and
certification of an aircraft or new equipment. The
developers of the FCOM, with training and publishing
backgrounds, work with specifications of the system
furnished by the engineers and with expert pilots.
Frequently sections of the FCOM can be derived from
earlier generations or manuals from other airplanes [7].
Following iteration and the review and certification
processes, the final version of the manuals is made
available for publication and distribution. Updates to the
manuals are provided to pilots with additional
information about new avionics loads and improved
sections.
The authors of the FCOM are faced with a number of
human-factors issues in capturing and presenting the
information in readable, understandable formats. In
addition, the FCOM is required to serve as both a means
for educating the beginner as well as a reference source for
the expert operator.
2. CANONICAL RULE BASED DESCRIPTIONS
OF THE AVIONICS
The specification of avionics systems include numerous
rules made by the designers of the system about how the
aircraft should “behave” in certain situations. This
decision logic can be organized as a canonical rule-based
description, which can serve multiple purposes, including
the generation of training material. Sherry [8] introduced
a canonical rule-based, situation-action pair representation
to describe the behavior of avionics:
Intention = f (situations, actions)
Where: situations => conditions when an action
will be taken
actions => commands, changes to
displays or symbolic data structures
The situation part of the rule represents the overall
operational condition that the aircraft is in. The situation
is defined based on parameters that include: aircraft
altitude, aircraft speeds, the location of the aircraft in the
flightplan, the configuration of the cockpit, and state of
the on-board equipment and sensors.
Given a situation, the avionics executes an associated set
of actions. Actions include: pitch/thrust/roll commands,
modification to the flightplan, and new
speed/altitude/vertical speed target.
This canonical representation also includes information on
the intention of the action. This information is useful in
abstracting complex, detailed situation-action pairs with
an operational objective.
An example situation-action rule for an autopilot Vertical
Speed mode is illustrated in Figure 1. As is evident in
this example, canonical situation-action pair
representations of the behavior of autopilots are
dominated by the descriptions of the situation. In the
actual avionics software, up to 80% of the behavior of the
avionics is based on conditional IF-THEN-ELSE
constructs and logical equations. The remaining 20% of
the behavior of the avionics is associated with repetitive
tasks (such as closed-loop control of pitch), optimization
(such as ECON speeds), symbolic manipulation of data
(such as the Flightplan and cockpit displays).
Complete and Approximate Descriptions of Behavior
A canonical situation-action pair description of the
behavior of a system is considered to be complete when
all the possible situations that can occur in a mission are
included in the description.
Intention: Honor pilot request to maintain pilot entered
Vertical Speed to pilot entered Altitude at pilot
entered speed.
Situation : Pilot selects the Pitch Wheel above 400ft RA
and below 1500ft AGL when the Autopilot is
engaged in Takeoff. Go Around, Level Change,
Altitude Hold, or Altitude Capture
This situation shall occur when all of the following conditions
are satisfied:
a) Aircraft Altitude is between 400ft Radio Altitude and
1500ft Baro Altitude
b) Aircraft speed is between Vmin + 5 knots and Vmax +
5 knots
Comment: Aircraft speed has not violated the speed envelope.
c) Predicted Aircraft speed in 10 seconds is between
Vmin + 5 knots and Vmax + 5 knots
d) Aircraft is not within the Altitude Capture or Hold
region
e) Autopilot remains engaged
f) PROF mode remains not engaged
g) GCP Pitch Wheel is rotated
h) Radio Altitude is valid
i) Autopilot Pitch Mode is Takeoff, Go Around, Level
Change, VS/FPA, Altitude Capture, Altitude Hold,
Glideslope, Nose Lowering, or Flare.
Action:
• Closed-loop control of vertical speed using pitch
• Closed-loop control of speed using throttles
• Flight Mode Annunciation “THRUST | VS”
Example situation-action rule for autopilot vertical
speed mode.
Figure 1
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Scenario
Inputs
States
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Takeoff
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Behavior
Outputs
VSFPA Pitch Transition
No Transition
Transition Transition Transition Transition
Example Portion of Operational Procedure Table for Autopilot Vertical Speed Mode.
Table 1
An illustration of a method for formally validating
completeness is shown in the Operational Procedure Table
(OPT) example, Table 1. Mathematical models
underlying the model verify that for each situation there is
one and only one corresponding action.
The possible situations in a mission are defined as every
possible combination of values held by the parameters
that have been identified to be relevant to the behavior.
In the example in Table 1, aircraft radio altitude validity
and aircraft relation to 400ft, V/S wheel selection on the
Glareshield Control Panel (GCP), invocation of altitude
capture aircraft speed relative to Vmax and Vmin are
examples of parameters and their values.
A canonical situation-action pair description of the
behavior of a system is considered approximate when
either: (i) all the relevant parameters are not included (i.e.
descriptions of situations are simplified), or (ii) all the
possible values of these parameters are not covered by a
situation (i.e. situations are missing).
3. RULE-BASED DESCRIPTION OF THE
VERTICAL SPEED PITCH MODES OF A
MODERN AUTOPILOT
Transition to VSFPA
Autopilots in modern “glass cockpits” include modes of
operation that coordinate control of the pitch and thrust
axes. Level Change, Altitude Capture, Altitude Hold,
and Vertical Speed/Flight Path Angle pitch modes are
known as the Cruise Pitch Modes. These pitch modes are
available when the aircraft is greater than 400 ft AGL
when the Radio Altitude is valid and Takeoff, Go
Around, Windshear pitch modes are not engaged (or at
any altitude when Radio Altitude is not valid and
Takeoff, Go Around, Windshear pitch modes are not
engaged).
A cruise pitch mode may be engaged, disengaged or
inhibited from engaging. Hutchins [6] has examined pilot
difficulty in determining which criteria have been
satisfied.
A total of 252 mission situations affect the cruise pitch
modes.  These 25 scenarios are based on 62 parameters.
The engagement/ disengagement situations and the
number of parameters used in the rules for each cruise
pitch mode are summarized in Table 2. The rules for
engagement/ disengagement of Level Change are the
simplest. The rules for the engagement/disengagement of
Altitude Hold are the most complex.
Pitch Cruise Mode Situations for
Engagement/
Disengagement of
Pitch Mode
Parameters
To Level Change 23/9 15
To Altitude Capture 50/30 21
To Altitude Hold 88/23 21
To Vertical Speed/
Flight Path Angle
16/13 20
Summary of Rules in Autopilot VS/FPA mode.
Table 2
A typical description in the FCOM of the operation of the
Vertical Speed Mode for a modern autopilot is illustrated
in the left side “boxed section of Figure 2.
Mixed Content Descriptions
The description in the FCOM includes a lot of different
types of information. The different types of information
are not separated. They are intertwined in a narrative
description. The different types of information are
summarized below:
• pilot operation of the Mode Control Panel (MCP)
• the Flight Mode annunciation
• behavior of the autothrottle
• behavior of the Vertical Speed Mode
Buried Rule-based Description
The FCOM description of behavior of the Vertical Speed
Mode is included in narrative form. The conditional rules
for operation, underlined in Figure 2, are not highlighted
and difficult to separate into rules.
Given the incomplete nature of the training materials and
the type of training that is currently given, currently
pilots receive insufficient knowledge for the development
of complete and accurate mental models of the avionics.
Approximate Descriptions
The current FCOM description of the behavior of the
Vertical Speed Mode is an approximate and incomplete
description. The FCOM includes 12 of the 16 situations
in the actual software for engagement of the mode, and 4
of the 12 situations in the actual software in which the
selection of the mode is inhibited or in which the mode is
automatically disengaged.
The FCOM description of behavior is based on 9
parameters. The description of behavior of the avionics
software is based on 12 parameters. It is easy to see that
it is extremely difficult for a pilot to develop an accurate
mental model of the avionics without a complete and
accurate description of the behavior of the avionics.
Viewing these parameters, it is evident that the
operational complexity in the behavior of the autopilot is
necessary given the constraints in aviation. The behavior
of the autopilot is determined by parameters that represent
the environment (terrain and weather), aircraft dynamics,
pilot delegation of authority to the automation,
operational procedures, and technologies that enhance
capacity and safety (e.g. glideslope). Therefore, reduction
in operational complexity would be possible only with a
reduction in functionality.
4. CONCLUSIONS
A reduction in perceived complexity may be achieved by
reducing or eliminating differences between pilots’
operational models and the operational models encoded in
the autopilot. Complete rule-based descriptions of the
behavior of the autopilot provide the basis for
understanding the perceived complexity of the autopilots,
differences between pilot and autopilot conceptual
models, and the limitations in training materials and
cockpit displays.
The most powerful means pilots have of learning the
behavior of the autopilot is through observation. When
the cockpit displays do not annunciate a complete
canonical intention-situation-action behavior of the
autopilot, the pilot is left to create approximate models of
the autopilot’s behavior. Due to the nature of the logical,
decision-making of situation assessment, it is very
difficult to generalize behavior in a meaningful way.
Small changes in the value of a parameter used in
situation assessment can result in significantly different
actions. Feary, et. al. [5] have demonstrated the value of
this approach.
To support pilots learning complete canonical
descriptions of the behavior, Sherry & Polson [10]
propose using interactive, computer-based training to
incrementally increase the pilots’ mental model. Modern
Operational Procedural Knowledge:
Other Knowledge in the FCOM
Example FCOM for Autopilot Vertical
Speed Mode.  Underlined text provides
approximate model description of the
behavior of this mode.
Figure 2
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| Engagement Scenarios
| 7,8, and9
|
|
| Engagement Scenarios
| 10, 11, 12
| Engagement Scenarios
| 1,2, 3
| Engagement Scenario
| 4,5, 6
|
| Inhibit Scenarios
| 17, 18, 21, 22,23
|
Missing:
EngagementScenarios 13-16
Inhibit Scenarios 19, 20, 24-28
Howthe VSWheel works
|
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| How the VS-FPAdisplay works
|
| Pitch Mode disengaged
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|Thrust axis operation
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| PROFModeVS Targets
Pitch Wheel: When rotated slowly, results in 100fpm or .1 degree change
per detent. In level flight with FD and or AP/FD on, initial wheel rotation
selects V/S mode in 100s of fpm or FPA in degrees in the direction of
wheel rotation. In a climb or descent greater than 300fpm, the mode and
display are initialized to the current V/S or FPA when either the AP or FD
are engaged. Once engaged, the displayed value is always the selected
value. Selection of V/S-FPA mode disengages PROF, speed-on-pitch
(PITCH in the FMA speed window), altitude hold and glideslope modes
if LAND is not annunciated. Autothrottles revert to speed control
(THRUST in FMA window). Reselecting PROF resumes FMS descent
profile operation at the vertical speed as a FMS edit.
Rotation of the pitch wheel causes the aircraft to depart the FCP selected
altitude in vertical speed or flight path angle mode WITHOUT A FLOOR
OR CEILING ALTITUDE. Rotation of the pitch wheel enables the pilot to
exit altitude capture for 2 seconds where upon if altitude capture
conditions are satisfied, the aircraft reenters altitude capture. Otherwise
the vertical speed remains selected. This feature is operable in all modes
except dual flight directors control below 1500 ft, SINGLE or DUAL
LAND and below 400ft RA in the pitch autopilot or flight director
takeoff or go around modes.
Pitch Wheel: When rotated slowly, results in 100fpm or .1 degree change
per detent. In level flight with FD and or AP/FD on, initial wheel rotation
selects V/S mode in 100s of fpm or FPA in degrees in the direction of
wheel rotation. In a climb or descent greater than 300fpm, the mode and
display are initialized to the current V/S or FPA when either the AP or FD
are engaged. Once engaged, the displayed value is always the selected
value. Selection of V/S-FPA mode disengages PROF, speed-on-pitch
(PITCH in the FMA speed window), altitude hold and glideslope modes if
LAND is not annunciated. Autothrottles revert to speed control (THRUST
in FMA window). Reselecting PROF resumes FMS descent profile
operation at the selected vertical speed as a FMS edit.
Rotation of the pitch wheel causes the aircraft to depart the FCP selected
altitude in vertical speed or flight path angle mode WITHOUT A FLOOR
OR CEILING ALTITUDE. Rotation of the pitch wheel enables the pilot to
exit altitude capture for 2 seconds where upon if altitude capture
conditions are satisfied, the aircraft reenters altitude capture. Otherwise
the vertical speed remains selected. This feature is operable in all modes
except dual flight directors control below 1500 ft, SINGLE or DUAL
LAND and below 400ft RA in the pitch autopilot or flight director takeoff
or go around modes.
theories of complex skill acquisition [1] suggest that it is
reasonable to assume that pilots can learn to anticipate
and monitor the behavior of large rule-based systems.
Typical users of PC spreadsheets make use of
approximately 300 rules. Grand master chess players
(those who have studied chess intensely for at least 10
years) have mental-models that include 10, 000 to 100,
000 rules of behavior [2]. There are similarities between
pilot’s training, both formal and on-the-job, and the types
of training which office automation users and chess
players perform that strengthens this assertion.
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The relationship between the jurisdiction of pilots’
models of the operation of the mission and the
jurisdiction of models encoded into the autopilot is a key
determinant of pilot-avionics cooperation. When the
conceptual models have no overlap there is no chance for
“operator-automation disagreement.” When the pilot’s
and the autopilot’s operational models overlap, such as
speed protection, differences in these models can result in
“operator-automation disagreements.” When these
disagreements are not annunciated, “operator-automation
surprises” occur.
